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BAR BRIEFS
State. It is apparent that he printed these ballots without rotating the
names intentionally and for the designed purpose of taking an unfair
advantage over the Free Press. This act of perfidy on the part of
Frisky Buckles, occurring at the primaries is not so fatal to the Free
Press as had it been pulled off in the fall, and we are glad
he exposed this crookedness in the primary." Verdict for plaintiff.
HELD: Affirmed. The publication exceeds fair comment and criticism
as the libelous statements are set forth as facts.
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
In the December issue of the Los Angeles Bar Association Bulletin
we find an article by Hon. L. R. Yankwich, Judge of the Superior Court,
in which he designates some recent uses or applications of the Declaratory
Judgments Act.
In the first reported California case, Blakeslee vs. Wilson, 19o Cal.
479, it was resorted to by an attorney for a determination of his rights
under a contract of employment on a contingent fee basis. As the
question arose on demurrer, the Supreme Court, while upholding the
constitutionality of the statute, had no occasion to determine what relief
could or could not be granted under it.
In James vs. Hall, 55 Cal. App. Dec. 355, it was used to determine
a person's rights to certain motion picture films and productions.
Again, where the record showed that a controversy not only existed
but was being continually waged as to the rights of parties under a lease,
the Court, in Lane Mortgage Co., vs. Crenshaw, 56 Cal. App. Dec. 1163,
held it to b6 the duty of the trial court to determine such rights.
The Kansas statute has been used in a number of cases. In one
case, State vs. Kansas City, 1o Kan. 603, 204 Pac. 690, the statute was
employed to determine the right of a city to issue internal improvement
bonds, bearing a rate of interest greater than five per cent, without
reserving the privilege of prepayment at the end of five years, and the
Court said this:
"The proceedings in this- case serve to illustrate -operation of the
Declaratory Judgment Act. Execution of the city's internal improvement program placed it in this dilemma: If privilege of prepayment
were not written in the bonds, the city and its officers were exposed to
prosecution by the State for abuse of corporate power and violation
of law, and the securities might not be marketable. If privilege of
prepayment were written in the bonds, a heavy financial burden would
be placed on the taxpayers, perhaps unnecessarily. Formerly, the city
would have been compelled to choose one course or the other, and abide
the consequences. The law officers of the State could not give a binding interpretation of the statute, and, because of its ambiguity, could not
consent to the course which the city claimed it was authorized to pursue.
Therefore, a controversy existed, justifiable under the Declaratory
Judgment Act. The action was commenced in the district court on
February 7, 1922, and the defendant answered instanter. The cause
was heard on the petition and answer, and a stipulation that the pleadings
Stated the facts. The declaration of the district court was rendered
February 7, and the appeal was lodged in this Court on February io.
This Court was in session when the appeal was filed. Because of the
public importance of the question involved, the cause was advanced for
immediate hearing, and on February io it was submitted for final decision, an oral argument and briefs of counsel which accompanied the
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appeal papers. The city may now proceed with its improvements without any of the embarrassment and without any of the delay which would
have been encountered if the remedy of declaration of right had not
been available."
It has seemed to us, during the past two years, that the remedy
could and should have been resorted to in order to obtain judicial construction of the meaning of the term "loss" as contained in the 1927
amendment of the compensation law, to avoid the delay which has
occurred in payments to claimants whose permanent injuries have
resulted in stiffness of joints instead of severance, and to avoid numerous separate appeals.
PRESUMPTIONS
How frequently one reads the following in the opinion of a court
of last resort: "The findings of the trial court are presumed to be
correct," or "There is some evidence to support the judgment of the
trial court, hence it must be affirmed."
Undoubtedly a long line of decisions support the position taken.
Even where the reviewing court might have arrived at a different result
if originally tried before it, yet if there is not a clear preponderance of
the evidence against the findings, the judgment will not be disturbed.
The reason for such a rule is set out in Ott vs. Boring, 121 N. W. 126, as
follows: "It is recognized that there are many things which cannot be
spread upon the printed record, but may properly be considered by a
trial court and are of great, and often controlling, significance in determining the truth as between conflicts from the mouths of witnesses. As
experience shows, and from the very nature of things, justice is much
more likely to be done by leaning pretty strongly upon the initial determination than by endeavoring to treat a disputed matter from an original
standpoint. Hence the rule that there must not only be a preponderance
of evidence against such determination, but there must be a clear preponderance. The significance of the word 'clear' is not always fully
appreciated. Manifestly, that requires the preponderance to be so
apparent as to manifestly outweigh any probable legitimate influence
upon the triers of those advantages for discovering the truth which the
reviewing tribunal cannot have."
Yet, judging by what we occasionally hear, the thing that seems to
impress lawyers as well as laymen is the alleged fact that, in the everyday consideration of questions by human beings acting in the capacity
of trial judges, final judgments occasionally may be entered upon the
basis of a bad breakfast, or an uncanny ability to determine political
ground tremors, as well as upon fair and equitable application and
consideration of fundamental legal principles as related to evidentiary
facts; and as these things can no more appear in the record than some
other matters, they come away from the court of last resort with a feeling
that the real issues involved in their particular case are virtually left
unsolved, and the fact that "justice is more likely to be done by leaning
pretty strongly upon the initial determination than by endeavoring to
treat a disputed matter from an original standpoint" makes little or no
appeal to them. It is easy enough to make a broad application of law and
legal principles, so long as they affect the other lawyer or the other lawyer's clients, but it isn't so easy to make the application or to acknowledge
its correctness when our own interests or those of our clients are
adversely affected.

